Momentum and reversals : an alternative explanation by non-conserved quantities by Appel, Dominik et al.
Int. J Latest Trends Fin. Eco. Sc.                                         Vol-2 No. 1 March 2012 
8 
Momentum and Reversals: An Alternative 



















Abstract— The momentum effect in stock trading 
means that stocks performing well in the past will do so 
in the future, too. A recent (seemingly) proof of it would 
be a big discovery: Stock prices would obey laws similar 
to the Newtonian equation of motion. However, using 
the recent result that stock prices are distinct from 
stock values, the whole mystery disappears without a 
trace. Stock prices fluctuate chaotically (in a 
mathematical sense). Therefore the momentum within 
stock prices is easily explained by a self-fulfilling 
prophecy as long as enough people believe in it. In the 
recent experimental "proof" of the momentum effect, 
stocks had been traded thousands of times. In 
generalizing the well-known average cost effect, we give 
a second quantitative explanation for the observed 
results. 
Keywords— Momentum, chaos; intrinsic value; conserved 
quantity; average cost method. 
1. Introduction 
The efficient market hypothesis is one of the tenets of 
finance theory. In its strongest form, it postulates that 
past price movements should give no useful 
information about the future ones. Therefore 
investors should have no logical reason to prefer the 
winners of any period to the losers, because both 
should be priced fairly already (Dimson et al. 
(2008)). The efficient market hypothesis applies the 
classical theories of competition to finance by stating 
that competition among rational investors determines 
prices, so that they reflect the consensus estimate of 
fair value in the light of all available information. 
Despite the growing evidence on price distortions in 
forms of e.g. systematic mispricing, periodic price 
bubbles and collapses and levels of volatility vastly 
greater than the underlying dividend streams, the 
efficient market hypothesis has remained the 
dominant paradigm in finance (Vayanos and Woolley 
(2009)). However, the latest capital market booms 
and crashes, culminating in socially costly crisis like 
the one starting in summer 2007, have discredited the 
idea that markets are efficient. In consequence, the 
conception that prices reflect fair values has to be 
questioned (Vayanos and Woolley (2010)).  
One of the conundrums in this area is the so called 
momentum effect (cf. Fama and French (1993), The 
Economist (2011)). In short is says that a stock 
having behaved well in the past will do so in the 
future, too. It has a "moment of inertia", just like a 
massive body. If that is true, just picking last year's 
best performing stocks should be a good advice. It is 
of course in contrast to the standard advice of 
choosing undervalued stocks, which most likely 
performed lousy recently. 
A very thorough analysis of the momentum effect has 
been performed lately by Dimson et al. (2008). In 
many different stock markets, partly dating back over 
more than a hundred years, the authors simulated the 
following: Based on the stocks' last 12 month-
performance, each month the stock market was 
separated into three classes 
1. Winners, i.e. the 20% of best performing 
stocks. 
2. In-betweens, i.e. the 60% of medium 
performing stocks. 
3. Losers, i.e. the 20% of worst performing 
stocks.  
From each of these classes, only the best performers 
(of the last 12 month) were bought. After a holding 
period of one month, the three stocks were re-sold 
and three new ones were bought, choosing again the 
best performers from the three classes and so forth. 
Doing that (in simulation) for many years (sometimes 
over a hundred years), luck or coincidence could be 
excluded. The results were impressive, the returns of 
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the three classes in almost all cases showed the same 
pattern: Excellent performance of the winners, 
mediocre performance of the in-betweens and lousy 
performance of the rest. 
Nonetheless, Dimson et al. (2008) did not discover a 
recipe for becoming rich. In reality, prices will adjust 
due to the buying and selling of many people. But, at 
first glance, the outcome is puzzling from some other 
point of view: It seems to prove that there is 
something like a "moment of inertia" in value. One 
may even find the optimum observation period. Say 
observing for 10 months only and buying and selling 
every 25 days. From this, one may get something like 
a fictive mass. And one may create something like a 
Newtonian equation of value, similar to the real 
Newtonian equation for the position of a mass point. 
The whole thing turns into the conundrum mentioned 
above, if one realizes that a stock is a piece of a 
company. A real company consists of a very 
complicated network of buying, producing and 
selling. In the end, it (hopefully) delivers worth, i.e. 
added value. Management science tries to map this 
complicated arrangements into even more 
complicated equations. The success however is pretty 
limited due to complexity. And all this can be 
condensed in the above mentioned Newtonian-like 
equation? Indeed that looks like standing in the eve 
of discovering something as fundamental as quantum 
mechanics. This justifies people's enthusiasm when 
seeing hints for a momentum effect. 
In actuality, there is a fundamentally wrong 
assumption in the line of argumentation above. It is 
supposed that the stock price has a good correlation 
(at least in the long run) with the performance of the 
underlying company. In a recent paper, Appel and 
Grabinski (2011) however showed clearly that there 
is no such correlation: There is intrinsic value, which 
is a conserved quantity. It is essentially given by the 
cash the company will generate in the future. In 
contrast, there is market value. It is not conserved and 
it may fluctuate chaotically in the mathematical 
sense. (A more detailed summary of the author's 
findings is given in chapter 2. It explains the 
relatively new tenet of conserved and non-conserved 
quantities in management sciences). All of 
momentum's mystery vanishes without a trace, if 
(future) investment decisions are based on non-
conserved (historic) market prices, given that the 
latter can fluctuate chaotically under certain 
circumstances. It becomes obvious that the 
momentum effect is easily explained as a big self-
fulfilling prophecy. For centuries people bet on the 
lately winning horse. This is especially true for the 
stock market. There are even so called finance 
advisers advertising such strategies. (More details 
will be stated in chapter 3). 
Having taken away the mystery of momentum 
effects, there is even another (statistical) explanation 
of the experiment of buying and selling stocks based 
on their last performance: Each time a stock is 
bought, it is not bought in a fixed number. Rather a 
fixed amount of money buys as many stocks as 
possible. At each transaction, the investor gains due 
to the average cost effect. This extra gain is 
proportional to the square of the fluctuation in price. 
The fluctuations of good performing (interesting) 
stocks tend to be much higher than the fluctuations of 
low performing (boring) ones. At least partly the 
results of Dimson et al. (2008) are explained by this 
special version of the well-known average cost 
method. Of course it delivers real extra money, which 
however is (usually) consumed by trading fees. (The 
average cost effect is covered in more detail in 
chapter 4). 
 
2. Conserved values versus 
chaotically fluctuating market 
prices 
The essence of Gutenberg's systemic approach (1998) 
is that a business situation can be described by a 
function of certain variables. The systemic approach 
was borrowed from the natural sciences. It has three 
ingredients: 
1. The existence of a function is hypothesized, 
which potentially reflects the outcome of a 
system (= business).  
 
2. Proper variables are to be identified.  
 
3. Given the fulfillment of these two steps, one 
may try to find the function and discuss its 
behavior. This third step is the main subject 
of management science. Arguably it is its 
very definition.  
While the first step can just be assumed, the second 
one - finding proper variables - requires further 
investigation: In management sciences, up to our 
knowledge, Appel and Grabinski (2011) initially 
addressed this issue. They showed conserved 
quantities being the only proper variables for 
describing the system performance, no matter 
whether or not the system's characteristic is natural 
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scientific or managerial. Though, from a pure 
mathematical point of view, the behavior of non-
conserved quantities is completely deterministic, they 
may change unpredictably. This effect is called 
"chaos" (cf. Schuster (1984)). It is the reason why 
non-conserved quantities are improper for describing 
anything (cf. Grabinski (2007)). Non-conserved 
quantities namely tend to step-ups, i.e. marginal 
changes at the outset are amplified throughout the 
system and thereby may lead to drastic deviations 
towards the expected outcome (cf. "butterfly wing 
effect"). 
Researching chaos in management or economics is 
relatively new (cf. Ferreira et al. (2010), Filipe et al. 
(2010) and Grabinski (2007, 2008)). Yet the market 
or exchange value has been proven to reflect the 
archetype of a non-conserved economic quantity (cf. 
Grabinski (2007), Appel and Grabinski (2011)). 
Therefore building a business on observing and 
predicting (trends of) non-conserved market values is 
as ludicrous as accepting the calculation of next 
week's lottery numbers as a business (cf. Grabinski 
(2007 and 2008)). 
Figure 1: Progressive refinement of intrinsic value 
(Appel and Grabinski (2011))  
The definition of (intrinsic) value must not be 
confused with a philosophic sense, where the intrinsic 
value of something is said to be the value that it has 
"in itself", or "for its own sake", or "as such", or "in 
its own right", and extrinsic value is value being not 
intrinsic (cf. Zimmermann (2007)). Rather it should 
be understood in an economic sense as "value-in-
use", which is the conserved net cash flow generable 
in course of the acquisition and application of an 
asset, adjusted for the expected risk, uncertainty, 
inflation, currency exchange rates (if applicable) and 
the asset's obsolescence during its period of use 
(Appel and Grabinski (2011)).  
Any variable - e.g. the net cash flow - can be declared 
"conserved" based on two prerequisites adopted from 
the sciences (cf. "law of conversation of energy"): 
1. There is a cause for any change of the 
variable under consideration. (Therefore 
capable business analysts have to understand 
the drivers of the requirement for an asset's 
utilities as well as their magnitudes). 
 
2. There is a simultaneous reaction in another 
conserved quantity. (In business and 
economics, investments and market changes 
are to be considered in detail). 
Proper variables have been found indeed if both 
requirements are fulfilled. Being conserved, they will 
not change without notice; macroenvironmental 
catalysts affecting the requirement like political, 
economic, socio-logical, technological, legal, or 
environmental conditions have to change before (cf. 
Appel and Grabinski (2011), Hax and Majluf (1984)). 
Hence, by applying conserved quantities, the 
description of a system's (= business') future state can 
be accomplished in line with Guttenberg's approach 
(1998). 
The discrimination of conserved and non-conserved 
quantities was tested by analyzing the cash 
generation of several listed companies to calculate 
their historic intrinsic firm value. It was compared 
with their historic share price development. The share 
of the SAP AG (worldwide number 4 software 
company) showed a typical pattern. It is a good 
example, because: SAP has the advantage of being 
big enough to attract speculators. Changes in value 
are not distorted by big machines or other non-
operational reasons. In actuality, SAP's value is 
essentially given by its future cash flow determined 
by "real" customer requirements for the software's 
utilities. This is because in reality, nearly nobody 
buys a SAP system in course of speculation. That is 
the reason why SAP's intrinsic value - as defined and 
calculated by Appel and Grabinski (2011) - did not 
change very much, though the rest of the world lived 
through much turbulence. 
During the period under consideration, SAP's 
(intrinsic) firm value never showed such extreme 
turning points as the market capitalization. In 
between, the share prices often followed considerable 
up- and downward trends being long enough to be 
exploited. Such trends lifted the market capitalization 
above the intrinsic firm value by multiples ranging 
from 1.9x to 7.2x. In other words, the conserved part 
of the daily market price on average amounted to just 
24.5% and ranged from 7.2% to 68.4%. It seems 
appropriate to conclude that SAP's operations could 
not match the speculators' expectations! (Hence there 
seems to be no such thing as market values but only 
market prices). The Compound Annual Growth Rate 
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 ("CAGR") of the firm value was 10.2% per annum 
("p.a."), the one of the market capitalization just 3.4% 
p.a. Since any investor has to pay (most likely) 
overvalued market prices, comparing the underlying 
intrinsic value of a stock is inevitable in order to 
detect actually cheap shares instead of being fooled 
by the noise in the market (cf. Appel and Grabinski 
(2011), The Economist (2011)).   
3. Trading non-conserved quantities 
removes the mystery from the 
momentum effect 
Momentum is the commonly observed propensity for 
trending in market prices. In the most extreme form, 
it leads to bubbles and - at times of major reversal - 
crashes. It has been described as the "premier 
unexplained anomaly" in asset pricing (Fama and 
French (1993)). The reason is that, according to 
theory, the past performance of share prices is no 
guide to the future; the practice however proves 
otherwise (The Economist (2011)).  
Pure momentum strategies involve sorting stocks into 
winners and losers, based on past returns over a 
ranking period. Then winners are bought and losers 
are sold over a holding period. In well-functioning 
markets, it should be impossible to rip off profits 
simply from smart timing of buying and selling assets 
dependent on their past performance. Yet the most 
comprehensive momentum study provides extensive 
evidence that momentum profits were large and 
pervasive across time and markets. Covering over 
108 years of the top 100 stocks, which at today's 
measure amount to about 85% of the world's equity 
market capitalization, Dimson et al. (2008) verified 
that the return of the winners beats to one of the 
losers by about 10%-points p.a.: Starting 1900 by 
investing £1 in the winners, more than £4¼ million 
(14.1% p.a.) could have been gained. Investing £1 in 
the losers would have grown to £111 (4.36% p.a.) 
only. The medium 60% show a 9.01% p.a. So the 
spread between medium to upper 20% is just around 
four percentage points.  
 
Figure 2: Market capitalization (outstanding shares) vs. instrinsic firm value (10 year rolling forecast), applying 
the example of SAP 
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Two material limitations however attend trading .on. 
 
Figure 3: Value-weighted momentum portfolio returns for the Top 100 UK equities, annually from 1900 to 
2007 (cf. Dimson et al. (2008)) 
 
Figure 4: Return on winners minus losers for Top 100 UK equities, annually from 1900 to 2007 (cf. 
Dimson et al. (2008)) 
 
Figure 5: Extremes of equity market history from 1900 to 2007 (Dimson et al. (2008)) 
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Two material limitations however attend trading on 
momentum: 
1. Transactions costs can seriously dent 
performance, because with rebalancing, the 
turnover can be very high. For example, a 
12/1/1 strategy ranks returns over the past 12 
months, waits 1 month and then holds for 1 
month until rebalancing. For that strategy, 
winner and loser turnover averaged 31% and 
33% per month. (The opposing impact of 
frequent rebalancing, which benefits 
momentum returns, is discussed in chapter 
4).  
 
2. Winners underperformed losers in numerous 
periods, sometimes by a dramatic margin 
(cf. Dimson et al. (2008), The Economist 
(2011)).  
Momentum works off the proven premise that stocks 
having just risen in price are likely to keep on doing 
so, at least for an exploitable while. But this means, 
when performing value investing, i.e. picking stocks 
having low prices compared with intrinsic value of 
the underlying companies, a large part of the value 
portfolio will be at variance to fair value at any one 
time (cf. Bright (2009)). Not surprisingly, momentum 
strategies were not only reversed and falsified 
numerously, but also in each episode of turbulence, 
the losses experienced in the worst affected market 
were disastrous. Interestingly, the three great bear 
markets damaged the "value" - or rather the price - of 
the world equity portfolio far more than the world 
wars (cf. Dimson et al. (2008))! Given that the world 
wars for sure resulted in more severe breaks of the 
real (intrinsic) value creation of companies, it is 
completely unreasonable to assume that any bear 
market could result in more severe value destruction. 
Considering chaos sheds some additional light on 
both the large performance gap between winners and 
losers and the "value" destruction in turbulent 
periods. Up to now, it should be clear that trends in 
market prices are nothing else than temporary 
fluctuations of non-conserved quantities. Hence they 
cannot be foreseen and may be irrational, like 
demonstrated by Figures 4 and 5. Building on that, 
our alternative explanation to momentum is: 
1. Fundamentals - like the conserved operating 
cashflow of companies' businesses - add to 
intrinsic value. Dependent on the market's 
mood and expectations, they however not 
necessarily add the same amount to market 
prices. (Non-conserved) share prices 
therefore trade regularly above (conserved) 
intrinsic values. 
 
2. Given expectations drove share prices far 
beyond intrinsic values, the prices have no 
fundamental fixture anymore. In such cases, 
market prices can change chaotically in 
either direction.  
 
3. The outperformance of the winner portfolio 
therefore can be mostly explained by the 
spreads between intrinsic values and share 
prices, because they regularly leave ample 
room for chaotic behavior. And, because 
trends in prices may continue unreasonably, 
the rational advice to any tradesman to buy 
low and sell high becomes (temporarily) 
obsolete in the context of trading on 
momentum. 
In a nutshell, in cases of momentum traders 
outperforming value investors, this is possible mostly 
because momentum bases on the potentially chaotic 
behavior of non-conserved market prices. Hence, 
ultimately, good luck!  
 
4. Average Cost in trading 
If somebody buys a certain amount of something at a 
regular basis, it will amount to N times that amount 
after N periods. Assuming an average price <p> per 
mentioned amount, one will have spent N times <p> 
for it. In contrast one may spend exactly <p> each 
time. The total spending will also be N times <p>. 
However, because one bought more when the price 
was low and less when the price was high, the total 
amount will be bigger. Exactly this is called the 
average cost effect. It is a useful and well-known way 
if someone is investing regularly in a certain asset. 
Normally the effect is small, because each time one 
gains a certain percentage in the order of the squared 
fluctuation. A similar thing happens by the buying 
and selling simulated by Dimson et al. (2008). But its 
effect may be much bigger. First of all, over the very 
long period, buying and selling happens many times. 
Second, the fluctuations are big because the average 
is taken over a long period of time. In order to see 
how it works quantitatively, we will give a 
mathematical description of the statement above. 
Let's assume to have two stocks i and j. Their 
corresponding prices are: 
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Their (time dependent) fluctuation is denoted by Δ. 
The exponential function in front is due to the 
compound interest rate p. (For simplicity, we assume 
the same average interest rate for both stocks. But 
this is no real limitation). Starting with say pi at t = 0 
and investing one currency unit, one has at t = Δt:  
    
      (  )
      ( )
 
For that, one buys the stock j at a price 
    
      (  ) 
Doing the same at t = 2Δt, 3Δt, 4Δt, and so forth one 
will end up with equation 2: 
 
Defining a relative fluctuation Δr as: 
      
  
    (   )
      
     
                                                      ( ) 
Eq. (2) can be written as:  
    
     
      ( )
 ∏(
      
    
      
     
      
  
      
  )
   
 
   
             ( ) 
The factor in front (before the product Π) is the value 
by holding stock i without exchanges for a time t = 
NΔ t. The second factor (with the product Π) denotes 
the "gain" for the exchanging. Because the relative 
fluctuation Δr can be negative or positive, it is not 
clear whether this factor is bigger (gain) or smaller 
(loss) than 1. However, fluctuations as defined in (1) 
in connection with (3) are symmetric. Taking the 
additional (admittedly non-trivial) assumption that 
the fluctuations of stock i and j are uncorrelated, one 
can show that the second factor is always bigger than 
1. In other words, there is a gain due to the average 
cost method. The simplest way to see how it works is 
to make a Taylor expansion in the Δr's in (4). Of 
course, all odd powers of Δr will vanish (on average). 
Then one will get in lowest order in Δr the following: 
 (  ) 
     
      ( ) 
(
   ∑(    
    )
 
  (    
  )  
   
 
   
)
      ( ) 
The next term will be fourth power. It is neglected 
here. In order to estimate the magnitude, one may 
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The gain due to the exchange can be expressed by an 
extra interest a (in addition to p). Using the definition 
(6) in (5), the additional interest a can be derived 
from equating: 
  (   )    
                                                 ( ) 
Solving for a leads to: 
  
  (  (   )    
 )
    
                                    ( ) 
Equation (8) is the additional interest from the N 
exchanges. In the experiment described in chapter 3, 
the monthly exchanges went on for 108 years (N = 
1296). With this the plot of (8) is given below in 
figure 6. 
Figure 6: Additional interest rate "a" due to 
exchanges over 108 years 
Figure 6 shows it is easily possible to gain a couple 
of percentage points due to the average cost method.  
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Please note that the entire spread from medium 60% 
to upper 20% was just four percentage points in the 
simulated performed by Dimson et al. (2008). This is 
easily explained by an (extra) relative monthly 
fluctuation of little over 20%.  
Of course our extra interest due to the average cost 
method should be tested with real date. 
Unfortunately, we do not have access to the particular 
data of the stocks over 108 years. Just to see how it 
works in reality, we have taken two quite 
independent stocks, namely AFL (American Family 
Life Assurance Company) and GD (General 
Dynamics).  
Both gained in prices by a factor of around nine 
between January 1985 and January 1995. So it would 
have been totally irrelevant which stock to 
Figure 7: Values of two arbitrary stocks and if 
exchanged monthly 
choose over the ten years. In Figure 7, we have 
displayed what happened with both stocks 
individually, and what would have happened, if we 
had exchanged both stocks monthly over the ten year 
period. The gain in annual interest is over four 
percentage points per year. That is an average cost 
effect. (Please note that the period of ten years 
considered here is much too short. Though we have 
120 monthly values, the major changes are within a 
few months. Therefore statistical assumptions as 
taken above are by no means justified). 
We close with a short note on whether or not the gain 
from the average cost method is a real one. Where 
does it come from? It is real and it comes from all 
people not dealing in the same way. So if everybody 
used the average cost method, the market would be 
distorted and there would not be the purely statistical 
fluctuations. The same is true, if some people knew 
about the future market (for whatever reason). Again, 
the fluctuations would not be by chance any more.  
 
 
5. Conclusions and next steps  
We have clearly shown that the so-called 
"momentum effect" is by no means a surprise. 
Because market prices are non-conserved quantities, 
they may fluctuate chaotically. With it, the 
momentum effect is easily explained as a giant self-
fulfilling prophecy. Assuming that top stocks 
fluctuate more, at least part of the effect may be due 
to a generalized average cost effect. (Top stocks 
fluctuate more, because they are more interesting 
than the boring middle 60% or the pathological 20% 
at the bottom. Another line of argumentation is that 
fluctuation is synonymous with uncertainty here. And 
uncertainty demands a premium). 
As a further proof of our theory, one should take the 
original stock data of Dimson et al. (2008). Two tests 
should be performed:  
1. Though the time span was long, the question 
is whether or not particular occasions 
determined the entire picture more than the 
time span of a hundred years. As a 
suggestion, one may take the five (one) 
percent best and/or worst months out of the 
data applied for simulation. What happens to 
the general picture? This test is about the 
statistics. 
2. One should quantify the average cost effect 
as described in chapter 4. How big is it 
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